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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
One of my areas of interest as a teacher is the protectionist
forces in the United States, at which I am now quite bothered.
They are doing things against the interests of the developing
countries. Protectionist trends in the ITC and elsewhere in the
U.S. are apparently likely to continue, and unfortunately these
trends are backed up by some ambiguous legislation, e.g., the
Trade Act of 1974.
The Trade Act has loopholes that can be used by protectionist
forces in the U.S., but I hope they will not continue to be used to
the disadvantage of the developing countries. For example, the
ITC "clear glass" case in 1971, an anti-dumping case concerning
Taiwan, was based on statistics relating to Japan. This was one
of the more extreme actions of the ITC in this area. I hope that the
ROC's success in trade in the last few years will not lead
protectionist forces to hurt Taiwan.
Finally, I hope that international organizations will realize
the inadvisability of Taiwan's non-participation in them. It would
only be to the benefit of the entire trading world if Taiwan were to
participate in these international organizations.
Professor Oldman thanked Professor Laing for his comments
and turned the floor over to R. Daniel Webster, Legal Advisor to
Chairman Daniel Minchew of the U.S. International Trade
Commission.
[The following is a summary of Mr. Webster's comments,
together with additional remarks submitted for publication after
the conference.]
COMMENTS
R. DAN WEBSTER
I would like to talk briefly about two recent decisions made by
the ITC that may have significant impact on Taiwan.
The first is'the footwear case. In this case the ITC found that
footwear was being imported into the United States in such
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increased quantities that it was a substantial cause of injury to a
domestic industry. The ITC recommended that a tariff rate quota
system be imposed over a five-year period. The quota level would
be established at 265,000,000 pairs per year with all shoes
imported above that level to be assessed a tariff of 40 percent
annually, then reduced to its original levels at the end of that
period. The quota level for the ROC was 88,000,000 pairs. This is
to be contrasted with imports of 110,000,000 pairs in 1975. The
President exercised his authority to provide other relief under the
Trade Act of 1974, and notified the Congress that he was
attempting to negotiate orderly marketing agreements. Negotia-
tions are now underway.
In the television case, the Commission found that color TV's
were being imported from Japan into the U.S. in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the U.S.
color TV industry. An increase in tariffs on color TV's was
recommended to the President. While the President has not
formally announced his decision, indications are that he will
attempt the same orderly marketing agreements as in the
footwear case.
The ROC is the second leading supplier of U.S. imports of
television receivers. I would suspect that the President will
attempt to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with the ROC,
as he is presently doing with Japan.
There are certain advantages to orderly marketing agree-
ments which the President opted for in the footwear case and
which the Commission does not have in its authority to
recommend. The orderly marketing agreement process allows the
President to negotiate with the supplying country a level of
imports and possibly by doing so arrive at an agreement which
has less disruptive effects on both parties. There is the additional
benefit to the U.S. in that it is not required to give compensation
under the general agreement on tariffs and trade.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Considerable discussion has taken place as to whether the
U.S. International Trade Commission is properly fulfilling its role
in administering sections of the Trade Act of 1974 and previous
legislation amended by that Act. Most of the controversy centers
on the administration of section 201 of the Trade Act, which
provides the mechanism for relief to domestic industries seriously
injured or threatened with serious injury by increasing imports.
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This provision, known as the import relief section or "escape
clause," spells out the criteria the Commission must use to
determine eligibility for relief, and then to provide relief to remedy
the injury.
The most common criticism - that the Commission is
recommending relief which will be damaging to consumers or
cause serious international political repercussions - shows that
we at the U.S. International Trade Commission have not done an
effective job in educating the public and, in some cases, the bar, as
to our role in the overall trade policy network.
First of all, we are an independent agency, not a part of the
executive branch. Our funds are not reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget, and, as far as I know, we are the only
agency in the U.S. Government of which this is the case. The
reason is simple. The Congress, in attempting to exercise its
constitutional authority, under Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, to regulate international trade, decided to create an
agency which was totally independent from the executive branch
so that decisions could be made based on economics, rather than
politics.
The criteria for eligibility for relief from imports were relaxed
with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974. Under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, the Commission had not in a single case
been able to find a domestic industry eligible for import relief. It
was a conscious effort on the part of Congress, not the
Commission, to relax these criteria.
As for the criticism that the Commission has not considered
costs to the consumer in its recommendations, or that we have not
adequately considered the international implications of our
"protectionist" policies, let me just say that I am pleased we have
not. If we had done so, we would have been stepping well outside
our authority and usurping the role of the President as outlined in
the Trade Act. The Act provides that the President, after receiving
our advice on the economic impact of imports on the domestic
industry and our recommendation of relief which would remedy
this adverse economic impact, will weigh this impact against such
factors as consumer costs and international political ramifica-
tions and then make his decision. We do not take it personally
when the President does not implement one of our remedy
recommendations; if the law allowed us to consider other factors
we may have reached the same conclusions.
Despite the outcry against the U.S. "protectionist" policies,
there has been only one case since the Trade Act became law in
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The administrative character of law practice is due in large
part to the great authority exercised by the Executive Yuan, the
executive branch of government. Statutes in the ROC are often
broadly drafted grants of authority from the legislative to the
executive branch to handle certain matters. The executive branch
then drafts more detailed regulations and interprets them in the
best interests of the country as it perceives them. One example of
the executive branch's power to interpret is in the Regulations on
Visas for Foreign Passport Holders which state that a foreigner
should present "evidence of his purpose in coming to the ROC."
Since mid-1976 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fundamentally
altered practice under these Regulations by interpreting this
language to mean that all foreigners going to Taiwan to work
must comply with other regulations which only refer to techni-
cians. Accordingly, foreigners who are not techncians have found
it impossible to get a visa through normal channels. Examples of
harsh administrative interpretations are common in all areas, but
particularly taxation. Of course, the immigration and tax areas
are in large part administrative in the United States, too. The
ROC legal system, however, appears to allow substantially more
administrative discretion to its executive branch sub-departments
than the American system. One result of this preeminent
authority of the executive branch is a comparatively large degree
of administrative supervision of the economy. Indeed, two surveys
on U.S. corporate investment in Taiwan have mentioned excessive
government "red tape" as the major complaint of the investors.
Of course, government involvement in the economy also has
its positive side. Among these are the statutory incentives for
investment mentioned by Mr. Chun Li. In addition to these,
negotiated business assurances have also been an extremely
important factor in attracting investments. These assurances by
the ROC government to the investor have entailed such practices
as promises to purchase a plant's entire output at a fixed price, a
guarantee of raw materials supplies at a set price or the exclusion
of competing foreign products from the Taiwan market. The ROC
government has also played a positive role in trying to prevent
unnecessary conflicts between Taiwan and American manufactur-
ers by promoting education about foreign markets. After the
recent misunderstanding concerning reclosable plastic bags made
in Taiwan and exported to the U.S. which allegedly infringed an
American patent, the government took steps to help inform
Taiwan manufacturers about U.S. patent law to prevent future
incidents of this kind.
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An interesting aspect of Taiwan's exports to the U.S. and
resulting trade disputes involves the nature of the parties. Mr.
Myron Solter mentioned disputes relating to television receivers
and solid-state watches made in Taiwan and exported to the U.S.
It is interesting to note that a large percentage of these products
made in Taiwan are made by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
The disputes, therefore, are often not simple conflicts of interest
between Taiwan and the United States, but disputes between
American companies producing in Taiwan and American com-
panies producing in the U.S.
Finally, in regard to the papers relating to the future of ROC-
US economic relations, a change in U.S. policy toward recognition
of the People's Republic of China would not necessarily cause any
significant legal problems under ROC law. The ROC Constitution
(Article 141) requires the ROC's foreign relations to be conducted
on the basis of "equality and reciprocity." Recently the Premier
and the Foreign Minister have made public statements indicating
that they believe that the ROC's foreign relations include its
relations with countries which do not have formal diplomatic
relations with it. This constitutional standard of equality and
reciprocity, therefore, should apply generally to ROC-US relations
after a possible break in formal diplomatic relations. As long as
the U.S. continued to conduct economic relations with Taiwan on
a non-discriminatory basis, there is no reason to believe that the
ROC would discriminate against American business. The practice
of ROC-Japanese relations indicates that economic ties can
continue without major difficulties after the rupture of formal
diplomatic ties.
Professor Oldman thanked Mr. Torbert for his comments,
then adjourned the session for 20 minutes. Following this
intermission, Professor Oldman opened the session for questions
and comments from the floor.
